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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 782



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CCCE AID TO AFRICA IN 1ST QUARTER OF 1982 REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 May 82 pp 1195-96

[Article: "Central Fund for Economic Cooperation: 632.5 Million French Francs in Loans for the First Quarter of 1982"]

[Text] The Supervisory Council, the Committee on Loans to French Overseas Territories, and the Committee on Loans to Foreign Countries, all under the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation [CCCE], during the months of January, February, and March 1982 approved loans totaling 632.5 million French francs, broken down as follows (all loans are given in French francs):

Loans to Foreign Countries

Benin--Loan of 4.7 million francs to cover partial financing of the transformation into a hotel of installations of the village of the African-Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM) at Cotonou. It appeared that it would be sufficient to rebuild existing structures to turn them into an hotel. Given the interest afforded by the site because of its proximity to the best beach in Benin, the new establishment should have no difficulty in attracting a large proportion of the tourists visiting this country.

Cameroon--a) Loan to the Cameroon Development Corporation (CAMDEV) for 24 million francs as part of an overall loan of 48 million francs cofinanced with the BEI [European Investment Bank]. The purpose of this loan is to finance the construction of a new palm oil plant at Idenau, with a treatment capacity of 20 tons per hour, which should make it possible to handle the growing production of the plantations at Idenau and Debundsha, as well as the eventual surplus from the palm oil plant at Mondoni.

b) Loan to the Cameroon Development Bank (BCD) for 42 million francs and a loan to the National Investment Company (SNI) for 5 million francs. These two loans cover partial financing of the expansion of activities of the Swiss Farm Palm Oil Company (SPFS). With a production of 80,000 tons of palm oil and hearts of palm, Cameroon is the fourth largest African producer, after Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Zaire. Since 1968 the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation has supported the palm oil plan. The new loans are for the maintenance and development of the plantations.

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c) Loan to the Cameroon Shipping Lines (CAMSHIP) for 100 million francs. This loan is for partial financing of the purchase of two cargo ships. An invitation to bid was issued in 1981 for the acquisition of two new semicontainer ships, and CAMSHIP chose Chantiers de l'Atlantique [Atlantic Shipbuilding Company], despite heavy German competition.

Ivory Coast--a) Loan to the Ivory Coast Electric Power Company (EECI) for 8 million francs. This loan is to finance preliminary engineering studies for the construction of the Soubre hydroelectric dam. Situated below Buyo on the Sassandra River, 115 km north of San-Pedro, the Soubre site was chosen by Electricite de France [French Electric Power Company], which has been charged with the preliminary studies for the initial draft of the project. This dam will have a total length of 8 km and a total height of 28.5 m, and a water-retaining capacity of 1.0 billion m³. It involves a water-pumping station with a maximum capacity of 6,500 m³ per second.

b) Three loans to Ivorian development banks totaling 30 million francs of 10 million francs each: Credit de la Cote d'Ivoire [Ivory Coast Credit Bank--CREDICODI], Compagnie Financiere de la Cote d'Ivoire [Ivory Coast Finance Company--COFINCI], and the Banque Ivoirienne de Developpement Industriel [Ivorian Bank for Industrial Development--BIDI]. The opening of lines of credit in favor of these Ivorian banks appears to be an appropriate formula for the financing of small and medium-size companies. The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation has authorized two loans to each of the three banks under the following conditions: a jointly financed public assistance loan of 7 million francs in the first stage; and a jointly financed loan of 3 million francs in the second stage.

Gabon--a) Two loans to the Banque Gabonaise de Developpement [Gabonese Development Bank] for 2.2 million francs and for 2.24 million francs on a jointly financed basis. These two loans are for the refinancing of a loan to the Societe Plastique-industrie [Plastics Industry Company] (in order to extend the capacity of the plant), which manufactures: reinforced polyester glass products for septic tanks, refining and filtering installations, cisterns and water towers; and for the construction of canoes and boats, cold injected polyester products, furniture, and polystyrene foam products for packing and insulation.

b) Two loans to the Societe d'energie et d'eau du Gabon [Gabon Power and Water Company--SEEG], one for 3.48 million francs and the other on a jointly financed basis of 8.12 million francs. These two loans are for the partial financing of a program for expanding facilities for the distribution of electricity in Libreville. This project will expand the capacity provided by the electrical installations in the capital and will make it possible to reduce the use of the thermal power station, resulting in substantial savings in production costs.

Guinea-Bissau--A loan to the Societe d'economie mixte d'armement et de peche de Cacheu [Mixed State and Private Shipping and Fishing Company of Cacheu--SEMAPESCA] for 2 million francs. The loan is to finance a SEMAPESCA expansion program. The company will shortly begin production of shrimp in

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saltwater lagoons. This promising new kind of activity will use existing installations. The company will also process and sell fish landed by Senegalese ships from Dakar which are licensed to fish in Guinean waters. Repair of company ships is also provided for, with a view to chartering them to a French shipping company or selling them.

Upper Volta--a) A loan to the Republic of Upper Volta for 70 million francs for the modernization and expansion of the telecommunications system. With 6,400 telephones in service, or 1 line for every 1,000 inhabitants, the telephone network of Upper Volta is one of the smallest in the world. In order to satisfy requests for extensions of telephones already installed and those over the next few years, the Postal and Telecommunications Office (OPT) has developed a program for the expansion of the Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso networks, as well as for the construction of new switching installations in six provincial centers.

b) A loan on an exceptional basis of 50 million francs for improving the financial situation of various public and semipublic bodies, supplementary financing of investment projects under construction, and financing of state participation in the capital expansion program of multinational companies.

c) A loan of 14 million francs to finance a hydroelectric and agricultural dam at Toussiana, on the Yannon River. The difficulties encountered by the Societe sucriere de Haute-Volta [Upper Volta Sugar Company--SOSUHV] in its efforts to provide satisfactory supplies of water in its sugarcane fields have led the Upper Voltan authorities to apply to the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation to finance construction of this dam, which will regularize the flow of water in the Yannon River.

d) Two loans, one for 11 million francs and the other for 3 million francs, for partial financing of the project for modernization of agriculture in West Volta, using medium-size tractors. The first trial use of medium-size tractors in Upper Volta took place during the growing season of 1977-1978. Some 18 tractors and related implements were put to work. The tractor used was a simplified model developed by a French firm (Bouyer).

Madagascar--a) A loan of 8.9 million francs to finance the reconstruction of the irrigation network in the rice-growing area around Lake Alaotra.

b) A loan of 11.6 million francs to finance the reconstruction of the irrigation network in the rice-growing area around Atananarivo.

c) A loan of 9.55 million francs to finance the reconstruction of the road between Moramanga and Ambatondrazaka. The transportation of agricultural surpluses from the region around Lake Alaotra is possible as far as Moramanga over a road network 140 km in length and, from Moramanga, by the railroad between Antananarivo and Toamasina. The use of the road has become very difficult at present, owing to the damage caused by the rains over the past few months. This reconstruction effort will complement the redevelopment of the rice-growing area around Lake Alaotra.

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d) A loan to the Jiro sy Rano Malagasy Company (JIRAMA) for 2.3 million francs. This loan is for the partial financing of the small-scale hydroelectric project at Bezaha. The problem of the electrification of small, isolated urban centers has not yet been resolved in countries with a low population density, like Madagascar. The small consumption of electricity in such countries does not justify connecting isolated areas to the distribution network of the large cities over what are frequently long distances. That explains why these isolated urban centers are being provided with self-sufficient means of production of electricity, such as small-scale hydroelectric generating facilities.

Mali--A loan to the Banque nationale de developpement agricole [National Agricultural Development Bank] of Mali for 8 million francs. This loan, whose ultimate beneficiary is the Societe des Grands Moulins du Mali [Mali Large Mills Company], is for the partial financing of construction of a flour mill.

Niger--a) A loan for 19.6 million francs. This loan, which is accompanied by a loan from the World Bank and a grant from the FAC [the French Government's Aid and Cooperation Fund], in a project with an overall value of 71.6 million francs, is for the financing of a forestry project in Niger. The project involves the planting and maintenance of 3,855 ha of forests for the production of firewood and related service activity, the protection and development of 6,000 ha of natural forests, as well as activity involving forest protection, soil restoration, and water conservation.

b) Two loans to the Banque de developpement de la Republique du Niger [Development Bank of the Republic of Niger] for 4 million and 2 million francs, respectively. These two loans, whose ultimate beneficiary is the Societe nationale des transports du Niger [Niger National Transportation Company], take into account the importance of highway transportation in Niger. The loans are for the partial refinancing of a vehicle maintenance center at Parakou.

c) Loan of 60 million francs for financing the repaving of wornout rural roads and tracks, a forestry project, and additional work on the Hotel Gaweye.

d) A loan to the Societe des mines de l'Air (SOMAIR) [Air Region Mining Company] for 12.6 million francs. The loan is for the financing of the remainder of the participation of SOMAIR in the capital stock of SONICAR [expansion unknown]. SOMAIR has contributed the bulk of its assigned share out of its own resources. However, given the uncertain financial prospects as they reflect the present state of the uranium market, SOMAIR has asked the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation to refinance the balance of its subscription.

Senegal--A loan of 4.7 million francs for the partial financing of a project for the development of truck garden farming in the Gandiolais area in Senegal, in order to improve the supply of agricultural input (seed, seedlings, fertilizer, and small tools). Implementation of the project will bring together the local trade of the Gandiolais region and the people of surrounding villages (120 wells, 50 vegetable canning stores, and a warehouse for the centralization of sales).

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Seychelles--A loan of 2.5 million francs to finance the further participation of the Seychelles state in capital of the Compagnie seychelloise de promotion hoteliere (CORPROH) [Seychelles Hotel Development Company]. The Seychelles Government wants to regroup its hotel assets in a single entity benefiting from foreign technical assistance, to purchase a hotel, and to direct its efforts toward improving the quality of tourist services.

Vanuatu--A loan to the Banque de developpement de Vanuatu [Vanuatu Development Bank] for 6 million francs. This loan is for the financing of participation by the bank in the economic activity of the country.

Capital Participation in Banks and Companies

The Supervisory Council authorized the director general of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation to subscribe increased capital in banks and companies to an additional total of 27,583,400 francs.

Ivory Coast--Participation by the Central Fund in an increase in the capital of the Credit de la Cote d'Ivoire (CREDICODI) [Ivory Coast Credit Bank] totaling 4,333,400 francs. The Central Fund is maintaining its participation in the capital of the bank at 9.2 percent.

Tunisia--Participation by the Central Fund in an increase in the capital of the Banque de developpement economique de Tunisie (BDET) [Tunisian Economic Development Bank] totaling 4.25 million francs. The Central Fund is maintaining its participation in the capital of the bank at the level of 6 percent.

BCEOM--The BCEOM (Bureau central d'etudes pour les equipement, d'outremer) [Central Study Office for Overseas Equipment] has obtained the agreement of the Central Fund to increase the latter's participation in BCEOM capital for a total of 3 million francs. The Central Fund has also agreed to provide an advance to the BCEOM for 10 million francs to cover an authorized overdraft for a maximum period of 2 years. These advances are to facilitate participation by the BCEOM in transactions other than those financed by the FAC [the French Government's Aid and Cooperation Fund], including those financed by resources coming from the budgets of foreign countries. These advances concern only transactions taking place in countries where the Central Fund is in a position to participate.

SATEC--This concerns the Societe d'aide technique et de cooperation [Technical and Cooperative Aid Company]. The purchase of all or part of the shares held by SATEC in the capital of credit companies owned by overseas French departments has been authorized. These shares are held in SODEMA, SODEGA, and SOFIDER [expansion of these three companies unknown] by SATEC. The Central Fund may purchase these shares up to a total of 16 million francs.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

BELGIAN, FRENCH CITIZENS' ARREST--Four Belgian and two French schoolteachers were arrested in Angola Easter weekend, it was learned on 21 April. The six were apprehended while taking a boat trip from Kinshasa on the Congo River, on the border between Zaire and Angola. Engine trouble forced them to abandon the boat. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1231] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

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BURUNDI

BANK OF BURUNDI REPORTS COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1164

[Unsigned article: "Burundi: The Economic Situation (According to the 1980 Report of the Bank of the Republic of Burundi)"]

[Text] The annual report of the Bank of the Republic of Burundi for fiscal year 1980 includes as an introductory presentation an extensive account of the country's economic and financial developments during that year.

The year 1980 was marked by fairly unfavorable economic circumstances, mainly because of the poor coffee harvest made worse by falling prices realized from it. Also, overall growth has been small: up 1.8 percent in real terms, a rate drop of 44 percent from the 3.2 percent increase achieved in 1979. The slight advance in gross domestic product came mostly from the secondary sector which, however, accounts for only 15 percent of the make-up of the GNP.

The general financial situation showed an appreciable deterioration following the poor results of the coffee season; the government finance deficit increased.

In spite of the worsening of the deficit in goods and services trade, the balance of payments came out with a slight surplus of 28 million Burundi francs instead of the 907 million deficit in 1979 (1 Burundi franc equals about 0.067 French francs) owing to the sizable inflow of outside capital.

Because of the contribution made by foreign aid, gross foreign exchange reserves at the end of December 1980 represented an exchange value of more than 9 billion Burundi francs, covering about 9 months of imports.

Agricultural Production

The 1980-1981 coffee season was poor, with 18,628 tons exported (down 9,100 tons) including 16,921 tons of arabica and 1,707 tons of robusta. Exports generated 4.8 billion Burundi francs of revenue compared to 8.8 billion from the previous season. The United States (45.2 percent) and the EEC (35.1 percent) are the main consumers (France coming in for 4.6 percent).

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Production of seed cotton rose compared to the previous harvest, up to 5,614 tons: furnishing gin operations with 2,015 tons of staple fiber of which 1,515 tons were exported (223 million Burundi francs) and 500 tons delivered to the Bujumbura Textile Complex.

After the recovery registered in 1979, production of dried tea returned to the 1978 level with 1,455 tons. Except for a slight tonnage (102 tons) sold to Cameroon, exports were sent to the London and Mombasa tea auction markets. Sales generated 213 million Burundi francs. By the end of 1980, 84 percent of the program for setting up different tea projects had been accomplished.

The estimate of livestock at the end of 1980 came to 600,000 cattle, 731,000 goats, and 330,000 sheep.

The five reforestation projects in the process of being carried out will involve a total area of 22,600 hectares by 1985.

Mines and Industry

Mineral production has completely stopped; exploration is mainly concentrating on nickel and gold.

As a whole, the industrial sector registered satisfactory development. In order to meet growing demand, beer production capacity was increased with a target of 900,000 hectoliters by the end of 1981.

The Bujumbura Textile Complex (COTEBU) has experienced difficulties in selling its production since the market is still dominated by the accumulation of stocks of imported fabric; the complex only showed 22 million Burundi francs in sales. Blanket manufacture once again showed a decline (down 6.8 percent). Likewise, shoe production saw a drop of 8.8 percent, because of temporary difficulties with raw material supplies (plastic and rubber).

In the chemical sector, production of oxygen and acetylene increased (up 17.5 percent and 35.7 percent respectively). Manufacture of soaps, paints, detergents and cosmetics made progress. On the other hand, plastic bag production continued to fall off (down 32.5 percent).

The manufacture of cigarettes was affected by a 3-month interruption needed for the installation of a new assembly line. As of the beginning of 1982, the unit has integrated all stages of production starting with the tobacco leaf, no longer packaging imported tobacco which is already chopped.

Various industrial projects are in the process of being accomplished or under study: pozzolana-based cement production by the National Lime and Cement Enterprise (ENACCI), a Muramoya flour mill by the National Flourmilling Industry, a bottle and glassworks, plastic tubing, plugs/stoppers, and industrial brickmaking.

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Infrastructure

Road programs were continued. The construction of the hydroelectric dam on the Mugere was completed with aid from China. The Gitega power plant on the Ruoyironza began operation. The construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the Gitenge near Rwegura, the international financing for which is settled in principle, figures among the projects under study. The Bujumbura international airport modernization work has financing from the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation. France contributed to the financing of the telecommunications ground station as well.

The year 1980 was marked by recovery in tourist activity with 24,585 visitors (up 15.5 percent) and 220 million Burundi francs in income.

Foreign Trade

From being in surplus for 1976 and 1977, the balance of trade has since gone into deficit. Burundi's foreign trade is summed up thusly:

Millions of Burundi francs

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Imports	6,678	8,843	13,721	15,109
Exports	8,051	6,265	9,435	5,906
Balance	+1,373	-2,578	- 4,286	- 9,203

Among imports in 1980, consumer goods came in for 42 percent and capital goods for 19.5 percent; fuel purchases required 2.2 million Burundi francs. In exports, primary products registered 98.1 percent and manufactured products 1.7 percent.

The EEC and the United States are Burundi's principal suppliers and customers. Iran, Japan and China supplied 25.8 percent of its imports. Regional trade with Rwanda, Zaire and Kenya is relatively large (6 percent of imports and 2.9 percent of exports).

The balance of payments came out this way:

Millions of Burundi francs

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Goods and services	+1,900	-3,992	-3,826	-5,372
Unilateral transfers	+1,542	+1,875	+2,019	+3,345
Capital movements	+ 105	+ 438	+ 900	+2,055
Balance	+3,547	-1,679	- 907	+ 28

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In unilateral transfers, net contributions from international assistance amounted to 2.6 billion Burundi francs in 1980 compared to 1.8 billion in 1980 as published.

Finance

Outstanding public debt sextupled between 1975 and 1980, going from 3 to 18.8 billion Burundi francs. At the end of 1980 it included a domestic debt of 7.7 billion (treasury bills and Bank of Burundi advances) and an external debt of 11.1 billion. In 1980, debt service required 0.9 billion Burundi francs, corresponding to 7.7 percent of export earnings.

The overall budget for fiscal year 1980, revised in July, added up to 11.3 billion Burundi francs in receipts and 15.6 billion in expenditures, increasing by 6.3 percent in receipts and 5.3 percent in expenditures compared to 1979. Investment credits came in for 4 billion (up 0.4 billion). The budget's projected deficit was to be covered by resorting to domestic borrowing and adjusted by carrying payment for certain expenditures forward to fiscal year 1981.

The average rise in consumer prices in Bujumbura came to 11.9 percent over the course of 1980 compared to 24.2 percent in 1979.

The prospects for an abundant coffee harvest in 1981 (the long-term production objective was between 30,000 and 40,000 tons) are to have a more favorable influence on Burundi's general situation starting in 1982 and will permit the revival of development activities programmed in the Five-Year Plan which is in the process of being carried out. However, the low level of progress in coffee development will limit budgetary receipts and appropriations to capital equipment programs.

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BUFUNDI

BRIEFS

WORLD BANK AID—On 31 March Burundi's ambassador in Washington, Simon Sabimbona, signed a 14.2 million SDR (\$16 million) credit agreement with Mr Wapenhans, World Bank vice president, for financing the Ngozi III integrated rural project. The project is aimed at helping the farmers of Ngozi Province, which is the most populous one in Burundi, to increase production of coffee, the country's top export product, and to import other food crops. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 97] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631

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DJIBOUTI

COUNTRY BEEFS UP TOURIST INDUSTRY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 May 82 p 31

[Article by Claude Wauthier]

[Text] It is a question of destroying a myth: the myth of Djibouti as an infernal desert where nothing but "zinc palms" grow. And replacing it with a public image that is closer to climatic realities...and more likely to encourage tourism. The ministry of commerce, transportation and tourism--which is headed by Aden Robleh Awale, one-time leader of the Somali Coast Liberation Front--has settled down to the task.

The first thing tourists need to know is that Djibouti between September and April enjoys a pleasant climate with an average temperature of 27 degrees C. under a cloudless sky and has relatively cool evenings. The second is that the region turns out to have some of the most unique scenery in the world: marvelous undersea depths for diving enthusiasts; the prodigious vistas of Lake Abbe, with its calcareous pillars and flamingos, and Lake Assal with its sparkling salt-floes, girdled with black lava; impressive sites like Goubet, which according to legend is a pit in which lurk demons from a submerged volcano...The third thing, finally, that local tourism promoters emphasize, is that since the Sheraton opened (last November), Djibouti now has a major hotel--200 air-conditioned rooms, a casino and nightclub--to serve as a comfortable base-camp for tourists who will have to bump and lurch their way across the desert trails in jeeps or contend with the roll of a dhow on the waves of the Red Sea.

Among the leading development projects currently under study is one to exploit the country's geothermal resources: in this respect Djibouti is one of the most fortunate countries in the world, as witness the heat sources of Lake Abbe and Lake Assal, situated at a unique location where the earth's crust is only a few kilometers thick (compared to several dozen kilometers most places). The site selected for the first geothermal plant in Djibouti is Hanle, between the two lakes: the steam from the superheated ground water would drive turbines that would provide 20 megawatts of power--or half of the republic's current energy consumption, at less than two-thirds the cost of a power plant running on fuel oil. The Hanle power plant could also provide the heat needed for a fish-drying facility and the water for irrigation projects. The first borehole should be drilled in 1983, with financing being provided by several Arab countries.

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Arab countries are also the main financial backers of the proposed paved road between Djibouti and Tadjourah and the plan to make the capital city a port for container-ships. But development also means political stability. The young republic has been able to preserve a delicate balance between its two powerful neighbors, Ethiopia and Somalia, both of which have long hoped to annex it someday. According to the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Mimoun Bahdon Farah, the same concern for balance informs relations between Djibouti and the two Yemens. Yet for all that, Djibouti's foreign policy is not a spineless one: the government did not waver in its position in the fight over admission of the Saharan Arab Republic to the OAU [Organization of African Unity], and Mimoun Bahdon Farah, in the interview he gave us, made some harsh criticisms of the role played by Mr Edem Kodjo.

As for France, he told us, everything is going well. France is now giving us more, he said, than it ever did in 115 years of colonialism.

On the domestic political scene, it is a time for peace-making and conciliation: the last opposition political prisoners, including former Afar prime minister Ahmed Dini, were released several months ago. Dini, just like Ali Aref, who was prime minister during the last years of the colonial period, has gone back into private business and no one bothers him. "The doors of the People's Rally for Progress [RPP] (the lone political party, whose standard-bearer is President Hassan Gouled Aptidon) are not closed to them; Djibouti has need of all its sons," said Mimoun Bahdon, who is the party's secretary general.

Preparations for the legislative elections slated for 21 May are proceeding uneventfully: a single list of 65 candidates, all of them members of the RPP, will be presented to the voters. The campaign season opened on an auspicious note: for the first time in its history, Djibouti harvested wheat in April, on an experimental farm just outside the capital city: an event which in its own right is helping to efface the "zinc palm" legend. Even if the famous bar of the same name--where a terrorist attack in 1977 cost the lives of several French legionnaires and created a serious political crisis--continues to attract customers in the heart of Djibouti. Perhaps awaiting the time when it will be made into a historical monument....

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ETHIOPIA

RELATIONS WITH SUDAN UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE

London THE ECONOMIST in English 26 Jun 82 p 41

[Text]

Sudan and Ethiopia are divided by the longest border in Africa and have governments with wildly opposing political views. This week representatives of the two countries, Marxist Ethiopia and pro-western Sudan, met in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, to try to find ways to prevent themselves doing further damage to each other.

The border, some 1,200 miles long, stretching from the Red Sea to Kenya, is impossible to police effectively. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigre People's Liberation Front, both of which want independence for large slabs of Ethiopia, have their headquarters in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, and, say the Ethiopians, their members cross the border at will. Last August Sudan made the gesture of formally closing the fronts' offices, but communiqués about guerrilla activity continue to be issued from Sudan.

Ethiopia, according to Sudan, in turn provides a base for dissidents opposed to the Sudanese government: among them the 800-man army of Yagoub Ismail, an ex-paratrooper who fled from Sudan in 1976. His men occasionally slip across the border to cause trouble in the south, which by religion, history and lack of communications is cut off from the north.

This week's Addis Ababa meeting, attended by defence and security experts and foreign ministry representatives from the two countries, follows an agreement made last month to clamp down on secessionists and dissidents and "scrupulously respect" each other's territory.

Such sentiments have been expressed before. Now they could mean something. The talks are the climax of 20 months of diplomatic sparring between Sudan's President Numeiri and Ethiopia's leader, Colonel Mengistu.

In November, 1980, the two leaders signed an agreement of reconciliation. At the time Sudan was worried about a possible Libyan invasion through Chad, and in a display of strength conducted joint military exercises with Egypt, Somalia and Oman and received a bumper arms shipment from the United States. Last August, as a counter to Sudan's arms-rattling, Ethiopia signed a defence pact with Libya and South Yemen. In March a Sudanese delegation went to Addis to complain of Ethiopian interference, and in May Mr Numeiri threatened to station Egyptian troops on the border with Ethiopia under an agreement signed with Egypt in 1976. Egyptian paratroops paraded in Khartoum last week.

Colonel Mengistu seems to have accepted that Mr Numeiri means business. Will the Addis talks lead to a secure border? Not necessarily. In an interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper on June 6th, Sudan's head of state security said that past agreements were "mere words". This one would be "serious". All the same, Sudan still supported "the Eritreans in resolving the Eritrean question". It also seems unlikely that Colonel Mengistu will wholly repudiate Sudanese dissidents in Ethiopia. Now, where were we?

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ETHIOPIA

'MOLES' SEEN HAMPERING RED STAR OFFENSIVE

London THE ECONOMIST in English 26 Jun 82 p 41

[Text]

The Eritreans who want independence from Ethiopia have not survived by determination alone: during the 20-year civil war they have received vital support from a fifth column operating inside the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The extent of its penetration into key areas of the Marxist government's bureaucracy is just beginning to emerge after a series of arrests. Among the 200 or so persons rounded up in recent months are some 50 civil servants, including a department head concerned with foreign trade and two senior members of the foreign ministry.

According to government sources, Eritrean guerrilla commanders were often told well in advance of the plans of the Ethiopian troops sent to flush them out. They had good warning of the government's present offensive against the guerrillas, code-named Red Star. A visit to Eritrea last December by the Ethiopian leader, Colonel Mengistu, was known to the guerrillas a month

before he left Addis Ababa.

Apart from digging out moles in the civil service, the government has arrested a number of people in Addis Ababa said to be connected with two secessionist movements. One group of alleged saboteurs was said to have plans of the capital's water and electricity systems.

The atmosphere in Addis Ababa is tense. Even diplomats are observing the midnight curfew. A bribe no longer buys immunity from arrest and a night in jail. Several foreigners have been held for up to two weeks on accusations of spying. For the first time for some four years shots have been heard in the night, although no deaths have been reported.

The government is claiming success in its Red Star offensive, which is being personally directed by Colonel Mengistu. Nakfa, the last major town in guerrilla hands, is said to be badly damaged. But the cost in casualties to the government is believed to be high, in the ratio of five soldiers to one guerrilla.

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ETHIOPIA

RED STAR CAMPAIGN NOT ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 May 82 p 32

[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Red Star Fades"]

[Text] The decisive offensive is far from successful. Ethiopian forces have suffered four times the losses sustained by the guerrillas, reports say.

The "Red Star" offensive, launched 4 months ago with a flurry of speeches and a din of armored vehicles as the biggest operation the Ethiopian authorities have conducted in the last 21 years against the Eritrean guerrillas, might well turn out to be a falling star. In fact, the town of Nakfa, stronghold of the biggest resistance movement, the EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front], has still not been re-taken by the army, whose losses (wounded and killed) are said to come to nearly 20,000 men. Two other operations of smaller scope launched at the same time--in Tigre province (north-central Ethiopia) and the Oromo region (eastern)--seem to have ended similarly in defeat. It is undoubtedly a serious personal setback for Lt Col Mengistu, who had insisted on personally overseeing this "decisive" campaign.

Eleven Ethiopian army units--or nearly 150,000 soldiers--were thrown into the battle, under the operational command of General Gebre Kidan, the defense minister and hero of the Ogaden campaign against Somalia in 1977. Among the units were the 19th armored division, trained by the Soviets, and the celebrated Nebalbal (6th division) trained by the Israelis before the fall of Haile Selassie. To support the operation, almost the entire government and the Supreme Military Council (the DERG) had even set up field headquarters in Asmara, the Eritrean capital, before returning to Addis Ababa when it became obvious that "Red Star" might well be short-lived.

After a thunderous 4-week advance over terrain that had been prudently evacuated by the EPLF's 20,000 combatants, the Ethiopian troops--split into two autonomous groups (the 505th and 508th task forces), each supported by MiG-23 fighter planes and the famous Mi-24 antiguerrilla helicopters--were confronted in early March, at a distance of 6 kilometers from Nakfa, with a determined Eritrean resistance force. Since that time, they have not advanced a centimeter. Pinned down, doubtless, by the determination of

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the guerrillas--but also by their own weakness. Once the outcome of this offensive--which was supposed to result in a clean, quick victory--became doubtful, the traditional ills to which the Ethiopian Army is heir quickly reappeared: poor troop morale, unreliable re-provisioning of munitions and fuel, sporadic mutinies, distrust of officers suspected of providing information to the enemy, purges, etc.

Certainly Mengistu's men had a few local successes, including cutting the secret trails by means of which the Eritreans were provisioning their allies of the Tigre People's Liberation Front and the Oromo Front. But what a price they paid: the guerrillas have lost 5,000 (killed or wounded) while they themselves have suffered four times that many casualties, according to reports.

Moreover, despite the substantial amounts of equipment provided by Moscow and Tripoli (Libyan Hercules C-130's land frequently at Asmara, their cargo holds full of munitions and foodstuffs), the cost of the war--close to \$500 million in 4 months--is becoming increasingly hard to sustain. And in Addis it is being rumored that men like Captain Selassie Wogderes and Captain Legesse Asfaw, both influential members of the DERG, are criticizing the way Mengistu has organized the "Red Star" offensive--and are doing so with Moscow's blessings.

It is a fact that the two tangible results the offensive seems to have had so far are--to say the least--in contradiction to its initial aims. It has once again focused public attention on one of the longest and least understood wars on this planet. And, for the first time since 1978, when Soviet and Cuban advisers arrived in Ethiopia, the Eritreans are today in a position to counterattack. Militarily, and also diplomatically (an EPLD delegation recently went to several West African countries and apparently was given an attentive hearing), the guerrillas, who have been fighting since 1961 for independence, may well stand to profit from the turn events have taken. But this assumes, of course, that these men, with all their murderous fighting spirit, also know how to exploit their victories.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

EEC FOOD AID--The Commission of the European Communities has decided to provide Mozambique with emergency food assistance totaling 2.1 million ecus, including 5,000 tons of grain and 500 tons of powdered milk. The FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] has estimated that Mozambique urgently needs to import some 180,000 tons of grain as a result of alternating drought and excessive rain. The food situation is tenuous in the big cities. The United Nations is preparing an international emergency assistance effort. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1231] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

SOVIET TEACHING ASSISTANCE--The Soviet Union is going to lend its help to the establishment of four vocational-technical training schools in Mozambique. It is also going to provide the equipment for the classrooms, workshops, and laboratories. Soviet teachers will also be sent to give on-the-spot assistance to their Mozambican colleagues, and students will complete their training in the USSR. It will be recalled that three agricultural centers and two industrial centers built with Soviet technical assistance are already in operation in Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1231] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

RAILWAY RENOVATION--Renovation work on the Dondo-Derunde railway will begin in the second half of 1982. Mr Alcantara Santos, the Mozambican minister of ports and land transport, visited Dondo in mid-April to view the site where offices, workshops, personnel housing, and equipment storage facilities will be built. The work will involve restoration of a 70-km stretch of track. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1231] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516

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SENEGAL

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR 1982 BETTER THAN IN 1981

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 pp 1317-1318, 1319

[Unattributed article: "The Economic Situation in Senegal"]

[Excerpts] The year 1981 constituted a particularly difficult year economically and financially. Indeed, the drought that struck the Sahel in 1980 dramatically cut harvests in the 1980-1981 season. The drop in the purchasing power of farmers resulting from that, and the shortage of ground nuts, had repercussions on the level of industrial production and on the activity of commercial enterprises. For its part, the mining sector felt the aftereffects of the crisis experienced by the developed countries.

Despite the steadiness of world market prices in francs for oilseed and phosphates, exports were therefore at a standstill, whereas, because of the size of the cereal deficit and the rise in the price of petroleum, imports continued to rise. The deficit in the balance of trade rose once more. It was the same with the balance of payments deficit; despite foreign aid, a serious worsening of the situation, particularly in net foreign credit, was noted.

The bad harvests, and heavier and heavier indebtedness as well, caused serious difficulties in public finances: despite the corrective measures taken in 1980, implementation of the finance law of 1980/1981 resulted in an increased deficit, which would have been even higher if there had not been delays in payment of suppliers' invoices. Already rather heavily in debt towards the banking system, the Treasury was thus forced to have recourse to new advances from the bank of issue and other banks.

The only reason for satisfaction was the activity of the tuna fishing industry and the low level of inflation, held down, it is true, through costly intervention by the Equalization Fund and by price stabilization.

The year 1982 presents itself in a less unfavorable light for the Senegalese economy. The harvests for the 1981-1982 season have indeed been definitely more abundant. The rise in the quantities marketed and the rather significant recovery in production costs of agricultural products should have a positive effect on the activity of industrial and commercial enterprises. In addition, the Senegalese government, helped by the International Monetary Fund and STABEX [Stabilization of Export Earnings System], has obtained more time from its main

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creditors for the repayment of its foreign debt and has taken measures to limit the budgetary deficit..

The world phosphate market, however, remains dull; as for the world market prices for the principal products exported by Senegal, there has been a significant decline compared to last year. In these conditions, a very large increase in exports cannot be expected. The rise in farmers' buying power, and the resumption of economic activity, could, however, bring about a renewed upsurge of imports and cause a fairly large deficit in the balance of trade to continue, hence also in the balance of payments.

The regulations adopted at the beginning of the year to hold down the burden on the Equalization and Price Stabilization Fund, incidentally, are likely to bring about some worsening of the urban population's purchasing power. As for the efforts undertaken to balance the budget, it is not sure that they will be entirely successful, in the short run at least, given the extent of the arrears.

This means that even though the problems to be solved by the Senegalese authorities in economics and finance in 1982 are less serious than the ones confronting them in 1981, they will be far from negligible.

Agricultural Production and Fishing

The drought that struck the Sahel in 1980 had very grave consequences upon the level of Senegalese harvests for the 1980-1981 season.

Ground nuts were the most affected; the marketed production, which is the only amount known for certain, having already dropped by half in 1979-1980, was again cut by over 50 percent; as for deliveries to oil-mills, at 70,000 tons, they amounted to scarcely more than one-tenth of what they were in the 1978-1979 season. To meet domestic market needs while keeping a certain amount available for export, Senegal had to import sunflower seeds grown in the United States and soy oil from Spain and France.

In addition to ground nuts, two other ventures were affected by the bad climatic conditions: cotton, which for the fourth year running produced a lower harvest, this time by 15 percent, and paddy, of which production dropped nearly 50 percent, and of which, as in 1979/1980, there was no marketing.

Other crops performed better: thus slight progress over the previous season was noted for millet, sorghum, and maize; and manioc production proved stable; bean production dropped only slightly.

In any case, the harvest was insufficient to meet domestic needs. To make up for a cereal deficit estimated at 140,000 tons, Senegal therefore had to appeal for international food assistance: over 100,000 tons of cereals were supplied to it in 1981 under this procedure. As for rice imports, according to the FAO, they amounted to about 400,000 tons.

Better climate conditions, as well as a fairly significant rise in prices paid to producers had a favorable influence on the harvest volume of the 1981-1982 season. Of course, the volume is still uncertain; however, it seems

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reasonable to think that, as the table shows, it will be significantly higher than in the 1980-1981 season, and even than in the 1979-1980 season, while still remaining substantially below the 1978-1979 season, except for cotton and maize.

As for Senegalese fishing, the overall results for 1981 are not yet known with precision. It is known, however, that so far as tuna is concerned, the results have been very satisfactory.

Indeed, during the first 11 months, catches reached 10,100 tons, which is considerably more than for the whole of 1979 (9,100 tons), and especially than for the whole of 1980 (8,300 tons). Moreover, French imports of Senegalese canned tuna rose in 1981 to 12,400 tons, as compared to 10,600 in 1980 and 10,400 for 1979.

In the light of these good results, Senegalese exports of fish products seem distinctly to have improved (37.5 billion CFA francs, compared to 32.5 billion in 1980).

Mining and Industrial Output

Phosphates: The crisis through which the economy of industrialized countries is passing had unfavorable repercussions in 1981 on Senegalese mining sector activity.

Of course, calcium phosphate production, which had fallen considerably in 1980, improved last year by over 30 percent. But exports dropped off by 200,000 tons, or 16 percent, while local sales dipped somewhat less. A setback in both production and exports of raw aluminum phosphate was also noted. Only shipments of dehydrated aluminum phosphate gave proof of stability.

Industrial Production: The loss of purchasing power among the peasant masses and the shortage of ground nuts obviously acted as a rein on the development of Senegalese industrial enterprise activity in 1981.

During the first 9 months, the industrial production index, which had fallen significantly in 1980, improved by only 1.6 percent, and remained below the level reached 5 months earlier.

Of course, it was the oil mills that were mainly responsible for this weak improvement. However, setting the oil mills aside, the index showed an increase of only 6.7 percent, as a result of the recessions noted in the chemical industry sectors, and in petroleum refining, construction materials, and mechanical industries particularly.

Domestic Trade and Prices

The inadequacy of the harvests had a negative influence on trade activity. As early as 1980, the non-seasonal turnover of goods for the principal commercial enterprises, as calculated by the BCEAO / Central Bank of the West African States / had fallen by 6.5 percent. The recession continued during the first quarter of 1981 (9 percent). However, it was far less pronounced

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during the next three months (0.1 percent).

The evolution of domestic prices constituted in 1981 one of the few positive aspects of the Senegalese economic situation. Indeed, the retail price index "in traditional circles" rose on average only 5.9 percent over 1980.

This rather exceptional performance, in view of the international environment, cost the Senegalese Equalization and Price Stabilization Fund several billion CFA francs used to subsidize certain staple products, such as wheat and millet flour, oil, rice, and sugar.

However, the subsidies did not prevent the rise in retail prices from becoming more widespread at the end of the year (9.8 percent in the fourth quarter); unfortunately it is likely that the evolution thus started continued as of the beginning of 1982, because, to hold down the Equalization and Price Stabilization Fund deficit, the Senegalese authorities were induced to increase very considerably, on the advice of experts from the International Monetary Fund, the price of flour, bread, and rice.

For its part, the retail price index "in European circles" rose an average of 11.3 percent in 1981. A rise of this sort, which was not limited by artificial means, compares favorably with those observed in other African countries and even in some industrialized countries.

Foreign Trade

Export prices: It cannot be said that in 1981, the evolution of world prices was unfavorable to Senegal. Indeed, as a result of poor harvests, particularly in the United States, the prices of ground nut products remained at high levels, at least until the beginning of autumn: for the year overall, the equivalent in CFA francs of the average dollar market price for peanut oil increased by 56 percent! Unfortunately, for lack of sufficient supplies available for export, Senegal was hardly able at all to take advantage of the favorable situation, which is not likely to recur for a long time.

Meantime, the selling price, in CFA francs, of calcium phosphate improved by over 30 percent. The rise more than made up for the recession in quantity sold.

Quantities exported: In the absence of customs statistics, traffic through the port of Dakar gives a fairly accurate idea of the volume of Senegalese exports. In 1981, the quantities of goods loaded onto ships in this port amounted to 1.999 million tons, compared to 2.087 million tons in 1980 and 2.69 million tons in 1979.

Compared to 1980, the recession was essentially attributable to the fall in phosphates shipments. Exports of other goods, on the other hand, were higher to those noted for 1980 and even 1979, which, considering the shortage of ground nuts, is rather surprising. It will be necessary to wait and find out the details on Dakar port traffic to have this phenomenon explained.

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Total worth of exports: Since there are no national customs statistics available, there is no alternative but to refer to other sources of information to estimate the value evolution of Senegalese exports.

In 1981, French imports from Senegal decreased overall by 17 percent: 657.3 million French francs compared to 791.8 million in 1980. The decrease was due not only to a drop in peanut oil purchases (-66 percent) but also to a reduction in purchases of calcium and aluminum phosphates (131 percent); on the other hand, imports of canned tuna, as reported, increased significantly (+29 percent); it was the same, but to a much lesser extent, for French imports of other products (+5 percent).

During the first 11 months of 1981, imports by member nations of OECD from Senegal fell by 28.5 percent in dollars, which is about 8 percent in CFA francs. [as published]

It may be wondered, in the circumstances, whether Senegalese estimates according to which exports were said to show a slight improvement in worth during 1981 are not a little too optimistic.

It should be noted, in any case, that to compensate in part for the recession in ground nut product sales, Senegal received from STABEX last October an advance of 18 million ecus (or about the same amount in dollars). This advance will very certainly be complemented in the coming weeks; however, it is not certain that STABEX resources will be adequate to permit full compensation for Senegal's loss.

Quantities imported: Quantities of goods unloaded in the port of Dakar in 1981 amounted to 2.566 million tons, or 5 percent more than in 1980, but 6 percent less than in 1979.

Stagnation was noted in imports of petroleum products, and a reduction in crude oil deliveries. The overall increase as compared to 1980 was thus due solely to an increase in the unloading of various goods, among which food products must have weighed especially heavily.

Total worth of imports: In 1981, the worth of French exports to Senegal went up only 7.4 percent over 1980; 1,876.8 million French francs versus 1,746.2 million.

Exports of OECD member nations to Senegal fell during the first 11 months, in dollar worth, by 15 percent, which corresponds to a growth in CFA francs of something like 10 percent [as published].

Allowance made for purchases of crude oil not made in OECD countries, and which amounted reportedly all by themselves to 71 billion CFA francs (against 55 billion in 1980), it is estimated in Dakar that for 1981 as a whole, the worth of imports increased by 17 percent. There is every indication that this estimate is very close to the facts.

Balance of trade: Exports having at best stagnated, and imports having increased, the balance of trade obviously deteriorated. In terms of the balance of

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payments, the deficit rose from 103 billion CFA francs in 1980 to at least 130 billion in 1981: that means that the deficit was greater than the amount of exports, and that the percentage of coverage of imports by exports was quite considerably lower than 50 percent.

Public Finances

Despite measures taken under the economic and financial recovery plan implemented in 1980, execution of the law on finances for the 1980-1981 financial year (1 July to 30 June) ended in a deficit of 35 billion CFA francs, that is, considerably higher than the ones noted in 1979-1980 (19 billion) and particularly in 1978-1979 (4 billion). The deficit would have been considerably higher if the periods for payment of suppliers and even certain creditors had not been substantially extended. According to the head of state, it was due to the coincidence of three principal factors: increases in personnel expenditures, stagnation in fiscal returns, and the growing burden of public indebtedness. The latter factor seems to have been preponderant; indeed, the expenditures of the Autonomous Sinking Fund, charged with the service of the national debt, at 35 billion CFA francs, by themselves probably amounted to 30 percent of the state's ordinary revenues.

In the circumstances, the government had to subject the 1981-1982 budget legislation to review. Expenditures for equipment and charges for certain special accounts were restricted; the equipment budget, incidentally, was revised downward, and the total for capital expenditures to be funded from domestic resources was limited to the amount of extraordinary revenues, or only 2 billion CFA francs.

At the same time, the Senegalese authorities, after securing in September 1981 some help from the International Monetary Fund, started negotiations with state creditors, within the framework of the Paris Club, in October 1981. The negotiations turned out successfully, since for the 1981-1982 financial year, service of the foreign debt was reduced by nearly half. Senegal also succeeded in persuading its principal loan suppliers to agree to the principle of funding through foreign aid some portions of the equipment budget that are customarily the responsibility of the state.

At the same time, the government attempted to repay, at least in part, debts to suppliers. Considering the size of the arrears of payments, this is a lengthy task, however. It is not certain, indeed, despite measures taken to increase revenues and decrease expenses, that implementation of the 1981-1982 finance law will not result in a deficit again.

Monetary Situation

Net foreign assets: The heavy deficit in the balance of trade could not help having serious repercussions on the balance of payments. These repercussions are reflected in evolution in net foreign assets.

Constantly negative for many many years, these assets fell again by 51.3 billion CFA francs between 30 November 1980 and 30 November 1981. At the end of

the period, there was a negative balance of close to 150 billion CFA francs.

Yet at the same time, net deposits from the International Monetary Fund to Senegal amounted to 63.4 million dollars. The country also received the benefit of substantial special aid from other lenders.

Banking system credits to the state: To make up the budget deficit, the Senegalese treasury department obviously had to turn more often to the Central Bank. Between 30 November 1980 and 30 November 1981, banking system credits to the state increased by 28.9 billion CFA francs. The credits were multiplied by over 2.5.

Credit balance in the economy: During the 1980-1981 season, the increase in credit balance in the economy was obviously very minor. Since the start of the 1981-1982 season, in light of the improvement in harvests, some acceleration has been observed, as is logical. Thus on 30 November 1981, the increase was around 20 percent as compared to 30 November 1980.

The monetary mass: At the same time, the monetary mass also increased by about 20 percent. Indeed, among the various component parts, the drop in net foreign assets was made up by the increase in banking system credits to the state. Thus it is not surprising that the increase in the monetary mass corresponds significantly to that of credits in the economy.

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UGANDA

PARIS MAGAZINE PUBLISHES INTERVIEW WITH IDI AMIN

Paris PARIS MATCH in French No 1717, 23 Apr 82 p 82

[Interview with Idi Amin Dada, former president of Uganda, by Leyla Umar, under the heading "Tell Us...Idi Amin Dada," date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] You have just made an appeal for solidarity in aid of your country, which is undergoing an intensive wave of repression, while you live in exile in Saudi Arabia. What do you think of the present situation in Uganda?

[Answer] Anything I could say about my beloved country would still fall far short of reflecting the significance and greatness it has for me. The Ugandans who were unhappy under my government are trying now to contact me to beseech me to return to power. Nowadays, it seems that at least 10 children are dying of hunger each day and that there is a great scarcity of medicines. When I was chief of state, journalists from all over the world who used to come to Uganda were free to write anything they wanted. Now, Obote has them, as well as members of the United Nations and the Red Cross, expelled.

[Question] Do you happen to be in contact with your successor Mr Obote?

[Answer] I send him letters asking him for a pardon and also asking him to let Uganda sort things out all on its own. But he disregards them. So, now I address myself to the whole world: Where are the big defenders of human rights? Why do they keep silent about what is happening among my countrymen? Where are the United States, Great Britain, France, China, the USSR? Everyone used to criticize my policies before. And today, when they should be watching very closely what is going on in Uganda and be coming to its assistance, they keep silent.

[Question] However, when you were running Uganda, you were accused of committing horrible crimes, of having wanted to massacre Israelis at Entebbe, and of having personally tortured Dora Bloch because she was Jewish. How do you answer to these accusations?

[Answer] There have been so many stories made up about things which have been imputed to me! People have even gone so far as to claim and write that I used to have the heads of my friends cut off and then drink their blood, and that I

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was a barbaric eater of human flesh. At the origin of all those unfounded slanderous things are the British, who are more barbaric than anyone in the world.

Question However, it is the British you call "barbaric" from whom you asked for a residence visa a year ago...

Answer I have no feeling of hatred for the British. On the contrary, I feel a deep love for Queen Elizabeth and for Margaret Thatcher.

Question Nevertheless, you had written some insulting messages to the queen: "If you want to meet a real man, come see me," and "Pull your stockings back up; they are wrinkled..."

Answer Those are only the ones that appeared in the newspapers. There are also the messages which have not done so and which, to the best of my knowledge, made the queen even more furious. I do not deny that I came out with those words. You cannot expect me to forget all about the centuries of oppression the British made my country live through. One of my greatest amusements has always been to enrage Her Majesty's subjects and humiliate them. If one day I get my visa for England, you will see the good jokes that I will manage to play on them to tease them.

Question And the Americans? What do you think about Ronald Reagan's policies?

Answer To tell the truth, at the start I did not have any negative feeling with regard to him. But, to the measure that I have been able to observe his actions more carefully, I have become aware that he is not a good man. His policies consist of doing everything so that the rich are richer and the poor poorer. Now I do not like him any more.

Question And Mitterrand? What do you think of him?

Answer I am not as well informed about Mitterrand as I should be. Nevertheless, I am carefully gathering information concerning him and should be able to give you my opinion soon.

Question Have you received death threats since you have been living in exile?

Answer In my country I escaped nine assassination attempts. That is the reason I am called the man with nine lives. Nowadays, I am constantly being pursued by Obote's agents who want to poison me. But I believe in the Almighty. I do not think that someone will be able to kill me so long as I have not served my country as I want to.

Question Is it true that you fled from Uganda with an immense fortune?

Answer Let me clarify things: I never fled Uganda. An army from Tanzania, six times larger than mine, started to invade my country. I only retreated in

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accordance with the tactics which the British had taught me. I had no other choice. Now, as far as my "big" fortune goes, I must tell you that there is no chief of state in the world as poor as I; you can ask all the banks and you will see that I have not deposited a single centime in them!

[Question] But how are you living in Jiddah?

[Answer] I owe a great deal to the generosity and solidarity of my Saudi friends. Moreover, I will never be able to repay them except with my eternal gratitude!

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ZAMBIA

CHURCH OPPOSITION TO KAUNDA COULD MOUNT

London THE ECONOMIST in English 26 Jun 82 p 42

[Text] Church membership in Zambia is growing rapidly. The churches claim nearly 4m worshippers, more than half the population. By contrast, Unip, the only legal political party, has fewer than 500,000 members, and is shrinking. Given this balance of loyalties, it seems curious that the party should pick a fight with the churches, especially as President Kaunda will be seeking re-election next year and has already alienated other powerful groups, including the trade unions.

The president told church leaders in March that he plans to adopt "scientific socialism" as Zambia's political philosophy. Scientific socialism is Marxism dressed up in its Sunday best and the church leaders were horrified. They saw the president's pronouncement as a move to eliminate Christianity and rushed to their pulpits to tell congregations of its evils. Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo told Zambia's 1.5m Roman Catholics that scientific socialism is "an unacceptable extreme whose consequences are tantamount to an erosion of basic human rights".

President Kaunda is thought by some

observers to be flying a kite to convince the more radical members of his party that embracing Marxism officially would be politically disastrous. If that is the case he will have to shoot it down well in advance of the presidential election if he wants religious support. It may be that Marxism, with its emphasis on centralised bureaucratic control, is attractive to a party which seems to have lost its way in recent years. The party's central committee, which makes all the major decisions in Zambia, is increasingly seen as a self-serving and corrupt clique.

Some members of the central committee point with understandable admiration to the political structures of Cuba, North Korea and Algeria. A new law is being proposed which would stifle the country's lively press. There are, however, dissenting voices in the committee, which has not yet formally debated President Kaunda's proposals. Even if he gets the go-ahead there, he may still be deterred by mounting opposition from the pulpit. If not, then Zambia is in for its most dangerous power struggle since independence.

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